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ABSTRACT  
   
Insider trading potentially reveals proprietary information, allowing rivals to 
compete more effectively against the insiders’ firm. This paper examines whether 
proprietary costs are associated with insiders' trading decisions and the profitability of their 
trades. Using a variety of approaches to identify proprietary information risk, I find 
proprietary costs significantly deter insiders’ trading activities. The deterrence effect is 
more pronounced when insider trading is likely to be more informative to rivals. 
Specifically, trades by top executives, non-routine trades, and trades at low complexity 
firms are curbed to a greater extent by proprietary costs. Examining the mechanisms of this 
deterrence effect, I find firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to impose 
insider trading restrictions, and insiders’ trading decisions are more sensitive to proprietary 
costs when they have higher share ownership of the company. These results suggest 
insiders reduce trading activities not only due to firm policies, but also due to incentive 
alignment. Finally, when insiders trade despite higher proprietary costs, they earn 
significantly higher abnormal profits from their purchase transactions. Overall, this study 
suggests product market considerations are an important factor associated with insiders' 
trading decisions and profitability of their trades. These findings are likely to be of interest 
to regulators and corporate boards in setting insider trading policies, and help investors 
make investment decisions using insider trading signals. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading is an important source of information through which insiders’ 
private information gets impounded into stock prices (Meulbroek, 1992; Damodaran and 
Liu, 1993; Aboody and Lev, 2000; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Brochet, 2010). Previous 
research has extensively explored the determinants and consequences of insider trading, 
largely focusing on the capital market implications of insider trading. On the other hand, 
the voluntary disclosure literature has focused on the trade-off between capital market 
benefits and product market costs of disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983, 2001; Dye, 1986; 
Li, 2010; Ali et al., 2014). One of the primary arguments for why firms do not fully disclose 
their private information is disclosures reveal proprietary information to rivals, who might 
use the information to compete more effectively in the product market against disclosing 
firms. In this paper, I argue insider trading conveys valuable information not only to capital 
market participants but also to rival firms, thereby potentially harming the firm’s 
competitive position. Thus, I expect managers in firms with high proprietary costs limit 
their trading to avoid the risk of the firm being disadvantaged in the product market. 
Although insider trading does not directly provide detailed proprietary information, 
such as the current status of a drug trial, it does convey insiders’ view on the prospects of 
the firm. If specific inferences can be drawn from managers’ trades, such information could 
prove valuable for rivals in setting product or marketing strategies. At a minimum, 
intensive insider trading may attract a competitor’s attention, leading the rival to search for 
more detailed information about the firm. Such information transfers would be especially 
costly for firms that operate in an environment with a high level of corporate confidentiality. 
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For example, R&D intensive firms that operate in competitive industries frequently enter 
into an innovation race with many competitors. When a firm succeeds in a R&D project 
before its rivals, competitors frequently suspend or even abandon similar projects (Gu, 
2016). In such an environment, reasonable inferences by competitors, such as the likely 
success of R&D investments or the progress of product development (e.g., FDA approval 
or clinical trials), may enable them to make more effective strategic adjustments.  
To investigate the link between proprietary costs and insider trading intensity, I first 
examine whether managers trade less at firms with higher proprietary costs. I measure the 
intensity of insider trading as the total number of shares traded, purchased, or sold by 
insiders during the year, scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning 
of the year.1 Since proprietary costs are not directly observable, I measure these costs using 
several approaches. First, following the suggestions of King et al. (1990), I use R&D 
intensity, the number of patent applications, SG&A intensity, product similarity, and a 
composite score of these four measures as proxies for proprietary costs. I find there is a 
strong negative association between proprietary costs and insider trading intensity. This 
negative effect is economically significant, as a one standard deviation increase in 
proprietary costs is associated with an 11% decrease in insider buys and a 10% decrease in 
insider sales. 
As an alternative identification approach, I exploit event-driven variation in 
proprietary costs. Specifically, I examine insider trading behavior during the period before 
new product launches, when the proprietary information risk is particularly high. I define 
                                                 
1 I also consider four alternative measures of insider trading intensity: i) dollar value of insider trading, ii) 
frequency of insider trading, iii) likelihood of the occurrence of insider trading, and iv) the number shares 
traded as the proportion of insider share ownership. The results are quantitatively similar.  
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proprietary periods as the year prior to a new product launch, and find insiders significantly 
reduce trading intensity during proprietary periods relative to other periods, consistent with 
proprietary concerns discouraging insider trading.2  
Next, to establish a causal link between proprietary costs and insider trading 
intensity, I use large reductions in industry-specific U.S. import tariff rates as a source of 
exogenous shocks that increase proprietary costs through increased competition. I conduct 
a difference-in-differences analysis to compare the change in insider trading intensity in 
industries that experience large tariff cuts to that of industries that do not experience such 
a shock. The results show that relative to firms in unaffected industries, firms in industries 
that experience a large tariff reduction significantly reduce insider trading activities. In 
economic terms, insiders reduce purchases by 11% and sales by 13% after a large tariff 
reduction relative to control firms. In sum, the evidence from tariff rate reductions supports 
the causal nature of the deterrence effect of proprietary costs on insider trading intensity. 
To shed more light on the results above, I examine how the relation between 
proprietary costs and insider trading intensity varies with informativeness of insider trading. 
I find top executives, who are most likely to possess proprietary information (Peress, 2010; 
Cheng et al., 2016), reduce trading activities significantly more than other insiders. Cohen 
et al. (2012) show non-routine insider trading has higher informational value than routine 
trading, which is normally associated with liquidity and diversification reasons. I find the 
presence of proprietary costs has a much larger deterrence effect on non-routine insider 
trading than on routine trading. Firm complexity also can be related to the usefulness of 
                                                 
2  As alternative measures of proprietary periods, I use the two and three years prior to the product 
announcement, and obtain similar results. 
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information signals. Frankel et al. (2006) find analyst reports are less informative for firms 
with multiple segments because of high information processing costs. Similarly, insider 
trading provides less precise information signals for multi-segment or multi-product firms, 
whereas it may convey information that is easier to interpret for low complexity firms. 
Consistent with this reasoning, I find the deterrence effect of proprietary costs on insider 
trading is more pronounced in firms with low complexity. Overall, consistent with 
proprietary costs discouraging insider trading, the deterrence effect is stronger when insider 
trading is more informative to competitors. 
The analysis thus far demonstrates proprietary costs are associated with reduced 
insider trading, but has not provided evidence on the specific mechanisms behind these 
relations. While financial gains from insider trading solely accrue to insiders, proprietary 
costs of revealing information are borne by the shareholders of the firm. There are 
potentially two reasons why insiders refrain from trading when proprietary costs are high. 
First, when firms have high proprietary costs, they may put in place insider trading 
restrictions to prevent information leakage. For instance, in addition to quarterly blackout 
periods around earnings announcements, many firms employ event-specific blackout 
periods such as prior to announcements of new products, clinical trials, or mergers and 
acquisitions. I provide evidence that firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to 
employ insider trading restrictions. Second, independent from insider trading restrictions, 
managers may voluntarily refrain from trading if their incentives are closely aligned to 
those of the shareholders. My results show that insiders reduce trades significantly more 
when they have higher share ownership of the company. 
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Finally, I investigate the trade profitability for the insiders who trade despite the 
presence of high proprietary costs. Insiders face a trade-off between their own financial 
benefits and the firm’s proprietary costs. For insiders to trade, the resulting benefits must 
be greater than the associated costs. Thus, if insiders in high proprietary cost firms decide 
to trade, I expect them to earn higher profits, ceteris paribus, than insiders in low 
proprietary cost firms. Results are consistent with this conjecture; I find when insiders in 
firms with high proprietary costs engage in purchase trades, they earn significantly higher 
returns. A one standard deviation increase in proprietary costs is associated with a 3.69% 
increase in annual returns from buy transactions. However, I do not find evidence of higher 
profits for sale transactions in firms with higher proprietary costs. One reason for this is 
that insider sales are likely driven by personal liquidity, diversification, or other 
motivations that are not related to private information. Overall, these findings indicate that, 
although insiders engage in less trading in the face of higher proprietary costs, when they 
do engage in purchase transactions, their trades are based on more valuable private 
information. 
An alternative explanation for the negative relation between proprietary costs and 
insider trading is that higher proprietary costs are associated with higher litigation risk, and 
it is litigation risk that limits insider trading. However, there are several reasons limiting 
the plausibility of this alternative explanation. First, I include litigation risk, measured 
using the predicted litigation probability from Kim and Skinner (2012), as a control 
variable throughout the tests. Second, the correlation between the proprietary cost 
composite score measure and litigation risk is very low (0.9%), indicating these two 
measures capture different constructs. Third, the findings that insiders reduce purchase 
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transactions are unlikely to be explained by this alternative explanation because prior 
literature documents insiders are exposed to legal risk almost exclusively when they sell 
before bad news, but not when they buy before good news (Cheng and Lo, 2006; Johnson 
et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2012; Billings and Cedergren, 2015). Fourth, to further ensure 
the results are not driven by litigation risk, I partition the sample into litigation risk quintiles 
and find the negative relation between proprietary costs and insider trading holds across all 
quintiles of litigation risk. 
This study contributes to two strands of literature. First, this paper adds to the 
literature on the determinants of insider trading. Prior studies show that managers engage 
in insider trading to exploit private information (Ke et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 
2005; Dechow et al., 2016) and diversify personal wealth (Kallunki et al., 2009), but avoid 
insider trading to reduce personal tax burdens (Jin and Kothari, 2008) and legal risk (Cheng 
et al., 2016). I provide new evidence that product market considerations are also an 
important determinant of both insiders’ trading decisions and trading profitability. These 
findings are likely to be of interest to regulators and corporate boards in setting insider 
trading policies, and help investors better interpret insider trading signals. 
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the proprietary costs of disclosure. 
Studies on voluntary disclosure document that proprietary costs are one of the primary 
reasons for non-disclosure. I view insider trading from the perspective of information 
disclosure and provide, to my knowledge, the first empirical study on insiders’ strategic 
trading decisions in the presence of proprietary costs. This paper complements prior studies 
documenting that firms avoid disclosures about future earnings, profitable segments, 
7 
identity of customers, and financial constraints to maintain their competitive advantage 
(Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ellis et al., 2012; Bernard, 2016; Huang et al., 2016). 
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CHAPTER 2  
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Related Literature on Insider Trading 
2.1.1. Determinants of Insider Trading 
Theory suggests that an insider’s trading decision is driven by the insider’s superior 
information about the firm (Grossman, 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985). 
Consistent with this theoretical prediction, prior work shows that insiders take advantage 
of their private information in their trading. Ke et al. (2003) examine insider trading 
patterns prior to a break in quarterly earnings increases, and find insider net purchases 
decrease three to nine quarters before the break. This finding suggests insiders trade on 
upcoming earnings news, but do so far in advance to avoid the appearance of trading on 
private information. Similarly, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) document the ratio of 
insider purchases to total insider trades is positively associated with the firm’s future 
earnings performance. Huddart et al. (2007) document insider transactions are clustered 
immediately after the earnings announcements but before the 10-K/Q filing dates. They 
find insiders profit from this foreknowledge of price-relevant information in those filings. 
Other studies have found insiders appear to trade on information about relatively infrequent 
corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions, Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, stock 
repurchases, dividend initiations, earnings restatements, and SEC comment letters. For 
example, Agrawal and Nasser (2012) find insiders increase net purchases before takeover 
announcements by reducing their purchases less than they reduce their sales. Dechow et al. 
(2016) document insider sales increase significantly prior to the public disclosure of SEC 
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comment letters on revenue recognition. Overall, prior literature suggests private 
information plays an important role in insider trading decisions.  
In addition to exploiting private information, there could be other motives 
underlying insiders’ decisions to trade. These motives include insiders’ diversification and 
liquidity needs, tax considerations, and litigation concerns, with most of the motives 
pertaining to insider sales. Using data on Swedish insiders, Kallunki et al. (2009) find 
insiders with more concentrated portfolios toward their companies’ stock sell their stock 
more intensively. Jin and Kothari (2008) report that the personal tax burden associated with 
the sale of vested stock discourages CEOs from selling their equity. Cheng et al. (2016) 
document a significant decrease in insider selling following actual shareholder litigation, 
indicating that legal concerns deter insider sales.  
2.1.2. Capital Market Participants and Insider Trading 
Information about insider trading can be disseminated to capital markets through 
various channels. The SEC requires insiders to report their trading activities on Form 4 
filings within two business days of the transaction date.3 As of June 30, 2003, the SEC also 
mandates electronic filings through the EDGAR system. In addition, various newspapers, 
business magazines, and web sites disseminate insider trading reports obtained from the 
SEC, which enables outsiders to easily access information about insider trading activities 
(Dai et al., 2015).4 
                                                 
3 Before August 29, 2002, insiders were required to file Form 4s to the SEC within ten days after the end of 
the month in which insider trades took place.  
4 The Wall Street Journal provides detailed information and analyses of insider trading activities via the 
“Insider Trading Spotlight” section on a daily basis. Moreover, numerous web sites are dedicated to collect 
insider trading activities from SEC filings (for example ww.secform4.com and www.insiderslab.com). 
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Prior studies examine whether investors and other capital market participants are 
aware that insiders trade on private information and react accordingly.5 Brochet (2010) 
finds there are significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns around fillings of insider 
purchases (sales) in both the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. Choi et al. (2017) examine 
abnormal stock returns around insider transaction and disclosure dates, and find returns are 
significantly higher around insider purchases compared to sales, indicating market 
participants immediately react to the information contained in insider trades. Sivakumar 
and Vijayakumar (2001) investigate analysts’ revision of earnings forecasts following 
insider trading, and document analysts revise earnings upward (downward) following 
insider purchases (sales). Together, prior research indicates insider trading serves as a 
valuable source of private information to the capital markets, and market participants react 
to the information contained in insider trading. 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
The information content of insider trading is not restricted to capital market 
participants, but is also available to competitors since trading information can be observed 
by rivals. There are at least two reasons why insider trading information is particularly 
relevant to rivals. First, compared to other sources of information, such as analyst reports, 
insider trading contains firm-specific information rather than industry- or macroeconomic-
information (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004), for which rivals can have the same degree of 
informational advantage. Second, compared to management forecasts, which are subject to 
                                                 
5 See Bhattacharya (2014) for a review of various topics on insider trading. 
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“cheap talk” (Stocken, 2000), insider trading conveys a more credible signal because it 
involves managers’ personal wealth.  
Such informational benefits to rivals represent a potential cost to the insider’s firm 
because competitors might use the information conveyed by insider trading in a manner 
that disadvantages the firm in the product market. Although insider trading does not 
provide specific examples of proprietary information, such as a proprietary formula of a 
drug, it does contain private information about the firm’s financial status and the prospects 
of its investment projects. In an environment with a high level of corporate confidentiality, 
private and forward-looking information about the firm enables competitors to set their 
product and marketing strategies more effectively. Specifically, intensive insider purchases 
may signal a positive outlook of a product, and hence attract competitors to enter into 
similar product markets. These signals may also induce rivals to change their production 
schedules or mimic successful business strategies (e.g., Botosan and Stanford, 2005). On 
the other hand, intensive insider sales may indicate the vulnerability of the firm. When 
competitors observe the weakness of a rival, they engage in product market predation by 
lowering prices or increasing expenditures on non-price competition (e.g., advertising) 
with the goal of forcing a rival to exit (Bernard, 2016).6  
To the extent insider trading may negatively affect their firms’ competitive 
positions, insiders need to consider proprietary costs when making their trading decisions. 
In a similar vein, the voluntary disclosure literature (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983, 2001; Dye, 
1986) argues in the presence of proprietary costs, firms may not fully disclose all their 
                                                 
6 As noted in Bernard (2016), exit is not necessarily in a form of bankruptcy or liquidation. It can take other 
forms such as exiting a specific product market or being acquired by the predator.  
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private information in order to prevent revealing proprietary information to rivals. 
Consistent with the proprietary cost argument, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) find firms 
operating in more concentrated industries are less likely to redact information. Ellis et al. 
(2012) find firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to conceal the identities of 
major customers. More recently, using large tariff reductions as an exogenous increase in 
competition, Huang et al. (2016) show that product market competition is negatively 
associated with management earnings forecasts. The authors interpret the results as 
consistent with competition reducing voluntary disclosure through higher proprietary costs. 
Finally, Bernard (2016) finds financially constrained private firms in Germany tend to 
avoid financial statement disclosures to mitigate the risk of product market predation. In a 
survey study, Graham et al. (2005) document three-fifths of surveyed CFOs agree or 
strongly agree that proprietary concerns are an important barrier to voluntary disclosure. 
Based on their interviews with CFOs, Graham et al. (2005) note “CFOs do not want to 
explicitly reveal sensitive proprietary information ‘on a platter’ to competitors, even if such 
information could be partially inferred by competitors from other sources.” Thus, similar 
to managers withholding earnings forecasts to avoid proprietary costs (Bamber and Cheon, 
1998; Ali et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2016), I expect managers in firms with high proprietary 
costs have incentives to abstain from insider trading to avoid revealing proprietary 
information. This leads to my first hypothesis:  
H1: The intensity of insider trading is negatively associated with proprietary costs. 
While financial benefits from insider trading accrue to individual insiders, 
proprietary costs of information transfer are borne by the firm’s shareholders. There are 
potentially two reasons why insiders reduce trading activities in the face of high proprietary 
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costs. First, firms with high proprietary costs may impose insider trading restrictions to 
avoid information leakage. For instance, many firms employ event-specific blackout 
periods such as prior to announcements of new products, clinical trials, or mergers and 
acquisitions in conjunction with quarterly blackout periods around earnings 
announcements. Second, regardless of the existence of insider trading restrictions, 
managers may voluntarily refrain from trading if proprietary costs are passed on to 
managers through compensation contracts. If this is the case, then I expect insiders would 
reduce trading activities more when they have higher share ownership of the company. 
Accordingly, this leads to the following hypotheses:  
H2a: The likelihood of imposing insider trading restrictions is positively associated with 
proprietary costs. 
H2b: The negative association between the intensity of insider trading and proprietary 
costs is stronger for firms in which managers have higher share ownership.  
Managers weigh the expected costs and benefits when they make trading decisions. 
While insiders obtain financial gains from their trading, insider trading incurs proprietary 
costs in addition to other litigation or regulatory costs. For insiders to trade, the expected 
benefits should be greater than the expected costs. Therefore, in order for insiders at high 
proprietary cost firms to be willing to trade, it must be that the expected benefits from 
insider trading are higher, ceteris paribus. Thus, I expect that when insiders at high 
proprietary cost firms decide to trade, they earn higher profits than insiders at low 
proprietary cost firms. This leads to my third hypothesis: 
H3: Conditional on insider trading, the profitability of insider trading is positively 
associated with proprietary costs. 
14 
CHAPTER 3  
SAMPLE AND MEASURES  
3.1. Sample 
The data in this study come from several sources. I obtain insider trading data from 
Thomson Reuters Insider Filings database, which provides transactions by corporate 
insiders, including directors, officers, and others (e.g., beneficial owners of more than 10% 
of a company’s stock), who are subject to disclosure requirements under Section 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In my analysis, I include open market stock purchases 
and sales made by insiders during the period from 1986 to 2014. Accordingly, stock option 
exercises and private transactions are excluded. Following prior literature on insider 
trading (Peress, 2010; Cheng et al., 2016), I focus on the top executives (CEO, CFO, COO, 
President, and Chairman of Board), as they are the most likely to possess proprietary 
information, and are likely to be sensitive to costs associated with information leakage. I 
also obtain financial data from Compustat, stock returns data from CRSP, analyst forecast 
data from I/B/E/S, institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional 
Holdings (13F), and executive share ownership information from ExecuComp. In addition, 
I gather product related announcement data from the database compiled by S&P Capital 
IQ. Finally, I obtain patent data from Noah Stoffman’s website, product similarity scores 
from Hoberg-Phillips Data Library, and U.S. import data from Peter Schott’s website.7  
I employ two samples for my tests: i) a sample of firm-years for my primary 
analyses related to my hypothesis examining the effect of proprietary costs on insider 
                                                 
7  https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents, http://hobergphillips.usc.edu, http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott, 
respectively.  
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trading intensity, and ii) a sample of insider trades for the analyses related to the association 
between proprietary costs and insider trading profits. Because the data availability differs 
across tests, the sample period and size for each test vary. For example, when R&D 
intensity and SG&A intensity are used as proxies for proprietary costs, the sample period 
is from 1986 to 2014. With the number of patent applications, the sample spans from 1986 
to 2011 because the patent data are only available up to 2010.8 With product similarity, the 
sample period is from 1997 to 2014, as most 10-K filings are only available from 1996 on 
the SEC Edgar website. Hence, when a composite score of the above four measures is used, 
the sample is from 1997 to 2011. Finally, when I use import tariff reductions as exogenous 
shocks to proprietary costs, the sample spans from 1990 to 2014 because U.S. import data 
are available from 1989. I also require non-missing data on control variables. This results 
in 52,896 firm-years (8,047 distinct firms) for my main tests, which use the composite 
score of four measures as the proxy for proprietary costs. 
For the sample of insider trades, I gather all insider transactions made by top five 
executives from 1986 to 2014. I then eliminate transactions without a sufficient level of 
accuracy and reasonableness, transactions completed outside of the open market, and 
transactions with missing numbers of shares traded.9 I also require non-missing data on 
control variables including the composite score of proprietary costs, other firm 
characteristics, and past stock returns. The final sample of insider trades includes 800,349 
                                                 
8 My sample covers one year ahead of data availability of independent variables because I use one-year lag 
independent variables. 
9 Following Dai et al., (2015), I eliminate transactions with Cleanse codes of “A” or “S”. The Cleanse 
indicator denotes Thomson Reuters’ level of confidence regarding the accuracy of the record. Cleanse code 
“A” indicates that numerous data elements were missing or invalid, and “S” indicates that the security does 
not meet the collection requirements. 
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transactions (107,273 purchases and 693,076 sales), covering 7,624 distinct firms. The 
sample selection procedures are summarized in Table 1.  
3.2. Variable Measurement 
3.2.1. Measures of Proprietary Cost 
Proprietary costs represent the reduction in firm value resulting from proprietary 
information leakage. Because proprietary costs are not directly observable, I follow prior 
literature and approximate these costs using several firm characteristics. King et al. (1990) 
argue property rights associated with innovations are not perfectly enforceable, and hence 
are a primary source of proprietary costs. Along these lines, King et al. (1990) suggest 
several empirical measures of proprietary costs including R&D expenditures, the number 
of patent applications, and measures of product market competition. My empirical 
measures of proprietary information costs closely follow these suggestions. 
The first measure of proprietary costs is R&D intensity. Given that R&D activities 
stimulate product innovation and technological change, a firm’s resource allocation toward 
R&D represents how active the firm is in innovative activities, which arguably carry 
significant amount of proprietary information. Consequently, firms with higher R&D 
expenditures tend to face higher proprietary costs (Wang, 2007; Ellis et al., 2012; Albring 
et al., 2016). I measure R&D intensity, R&D_Intensity, by dividing R&D expenditures by 
total expenses, where total expenses are calculated by subtracting income before 
extraordinary items from revenues.10  
                                                 
10 In alternative specifications, I scale R&D expenditures by either total assets or sales, and find qualitatively 
similar results. 
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My second proprietary cost measure is the number of patent applications filed in a 
given year. Firms with a greater number of patent filings likely possess higher degrees of 
secrecy, and thus face higher proprietary costs. This measure is widely used in the 
economics, finance, and accounting literature to capture the quantity of innovation (Aghion 
et al., 2005; He and Tian, 2013). I do not use the number of patent citations because the 
main purpose of the measure is to capture the amount, rather than the quality, of innovative 
activities and the firms’ desires to receive patent protections. I use a patent’s application 
year instead of its grant year because the former is superior in capturing the actual time of 
innovation (Griliches et al., 1987). Because the number of patent applications is right-
skewed, I use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents filed, NumPatents. 
Next, I use SG&A intensity as a measure of proprietary costs. Lev (2001) notes that 
innovation is mainly achieved by investment in intangible capital. R&D expenditures and 
the number of patent applications capture product innovation and development, but do so 
mostly for high tech companies (Faurel et al., 2016). Hence, to capture intellectual property 
associated with a broader set of innovative activities in a large set of firms, I use SG&A 
expense. The accounting treatment of intangible assets depends on whether the firm 
generates an intangible asset internally or purchases it externally. When a firm creates an 
intangible asset internally, the firm usually expenses it on the income statement as SG&A 
expense or R&D expenditure.11 When an intangible asset is acquired, the firm typically 
capitalizes it on the balance sheet as Acquired Intangible Asset or Goodwill. Because the 
vast majority of the firm’s intangible assets are missing from its balance sheet, I focus on 
                                                 
11 There are a few exceptions where internally developed intangibles, for example legal costs, consulting 
fees, and registration fees associated with a patent or trademark registration, are capitalized, but the number 
is negligible (Peters and Taylor, 2016).  
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SG&A expenses as it reflect a firm’s resource allocation towards intangible inputs such as 
human capital, brand, customer relationships, and information technology.12 Following 
Srivastava (2014), I measure SG&A intensity, SG&A_Intensity, by dividing SG&A 
expense by total expenses, where total expenses are calculated by subtracting income 
before extraordinary items from revenues. 
Prior research suggests that product market competition is related to the proprietary 
costs of disclosure. Theoretical models, in voluntary disclosure settings, suggest that 
whether competition encourages or discourages disclosure depends on whether the 
competitive threat comes from existing rivals or potential entrants. Theories of competition 
among existing rivals focus on the proprietary costs associated with disclosure, and 
generally conclude that competition discourages disclosure because it reduces the 
disclosing firm’s competitive advantage (Verrecchia, 1983,1990). In contrast, models of 
entry game generally suggest potential competition encourages firms to disclose an 
increased amount of bad news, along with good news, to deter entry and increase capital 
market valuation (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). Empirical studies 
that investigate the effect of competition on disclosure produce mixed results mainly 
because prior studies have used industry concentration to measure competition (Beyer et 
al., 2010; Lang and Sul, 2014; Huang et al., 2016). As noted in Lang and Sul (2014) and 
Huang et al. (2016), it is unclear whether a high level of industry concentration represents 
                                                 
12 SG&A expense reported in Compustat includes R&D expense. From private communication with S&P 
and from randomly selected 10-K filings, Peters and Taylor (2016) document Compustat includes R&D in 
SG&A in 90 out of 100 cases. 
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more or less competition, and how is it linked to proprietary costs.13 To more directly 
capture product market competition from existing competitors, I employ the product 
similarity score, ProdSimilarity, developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016).14 Hoberg and 
Phillips construct a text-based measure of product similarity, for which they analyze the 
product descriptions in 10-K filings, and calculate firm-by-firm pairwise similarity scores 
to quantify product similarity between any two firms. Then, the product similarity score at 
the firm level is calculated as the sum of pairwise similarities between the given firm and 
all other Compustat firms in the given year. The more similar the products of the firm to 
its peers, the more substitutable it is, and hence the greater competitive pressure the firm 
faces from existing competitors. 
Finally, since each of the above measures capture different dimensions of 
proprietary costs, I also construct a composite score, Composite, using an approach similar 
to the one used in Dai et al. (2016). Specifically, I standardize each of the four variables, 
R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, and ProdSimilarity, to have zero mean and 
unit variance, and then sum these standardized values to obtain the main composite score. 
3.2.2. Measures of Insider Trading Intensity 
I measure the intensity of insider trading as the total number of shares traded 
(TotalTrades), purchased (Purchases), or sold (Sales) by insiders during the year, scaled 
                                                 
13 Verrecchia and Weber (2006), Li (2010), and Ellis et al. (2012), among others, associate higher level of 
industry concentration with lower level of competition, whereas Ali et al. (2014) predict greater competition 
in more concentrated industries due to greater product substitutability. 
14 Another advantage of using ProdSimilarity is that, unlike industry concentration (e.g., HHI or four-firm 
concentration ratio), it is a firm-level measure that captures firm-specific proprietary costs. Moreover, Hoberg 
and Phillips show that firms with higher product similarity score are more likely to cite high-competition-
related words in the MD&A section of their 10-Ks. 
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by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. This measure is 
similar to those employed by prior research (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2005; Jagolinzer et al., 2011). Since TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales) is the ratio 
of the shares traded by insiders to the total number of shares outstanding, the range of the 
variable is a small interval around zero. Therefore, to preserve significant digits of the 
coefficient estimates on the independent variables, I multiply TotalTrades, Purchases and 
Sales by 1,000. 
I also consider three alternative measures of insider trading intensity: i) dollar value 
of insider trading scaled by the market capitalization at the beginning of the year, ii) the 
number of transactions scaled by the number of active insiders, where active insiders are 
defined as insiders who have reported at least one insider stock transaction during my 
sample period (Ke et al., 2003; Peress, 2010),  iii) the likelihood of the occurrence of insider 
trading (Massa et al., 2015), and iv) the number shares traded scaled by their share 
ownership  (Massa et al., 2015). 
3.2.3. Measures of Insider Trading Profits 
To capture profits gained from purchases or potential losses avoided from sales, I 
use the following three methods. First, following recent literature on insider trading 
(Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2014; Dai et al., 2015, 2016), I use daily alpha, Alpha, 
an intercept from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimates over the 180 calendar 
days subsequent to insider transaction dates. Second, similar to Ravina and Sapienza (2010) 
and Dai et al. (2016), I use six-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns, BHAR, 
which is calculated as buy-and-hold raw returns over the 180 calendar days following the 
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transaction date minus buy-and-hold returns for the CRSP value-weighted size decile 
portfolio. The third measure of insider trading profit is buy-and-hold raw returns, BHRAW, 
which is defined as buy-and-hold raw returns over the 180 calendar days following the 
transaction date. Profits are multiplied by -1 for insider sale transactions to ease the 
interpretation.  
Consistent with prior studies, I measure insider trading profits over a six-month 
period (e.g., Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2014). The six-month window is a 
reasonable period over which to measure an insider’s profit because Section 16(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires insiders to disgorge “short-swing profits”. 
Insiders are required to return profits made from the purchase and sale of company stock 
if both transactions occur within a six-month period. I also consider a 12-month period as 
an alternative window. The results are similar and conclusions are unaffected if returns are 
computed over 12 months. 
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CHAPTER 4  
PROPRIETARY COSTS AND INSIDER TRADING INTENSITY 
In this section, I present analyses of whether insiders reduce trades of their company 
stocks in the face of high proprietary costs, how the association varies with informativeness 
of insider trading, and the potential mechanisms through which proprietary costs 
discourage insider trading activities. 
4.1. Proprietary Cost Measures and Insider Trading Intensity 
To analyze whether proprietary costs affect insiders’ decisions to trade, I estimate 
following tobit regression model for firm i in year t: 
TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales)i,t = β PropCosti,t-1 + γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt +εi,t (1) 
where the subscript i, j, and t refer to firm, Fama and French 48 industry, and year, 
respectively. TotalTrades, Purchases, and Sales are defined in Section 3.2.2, and are the 
dependent variables in separate tests. The main variable of interest is PropCost, which is 
measured using four individual proxies, R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, 
and ProdSimilarity, and a composite score, CompScore.  
I include a series of firm characteristics that have been shown to affect insider 
trading decisions by prior literature. Insider trading activity is associated with firm size 
(Seyhun, 1986). Insiders in larger firms make fewer purchases relative to sales because 
managers in large firms are more likely to receive stock-based compensation than in small 
firms (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Roulstone, 2008). Therefore, I include firm size, Size, 
defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. 
Prior studies also document insiders sell more actively in growth firms, and are contrarian 
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investors who buy (sell) stocks with low (high) past returns (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; 
Ke et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). Accordingly, I include book-to-market 
ratio, BM, defined as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year, and past stock returns, PreRet, defined as buy-and-hold stock returns 
over the prior year. 
Insiders’ information advantage is likely to motivate insiders to trade and enables 
insiders to earn higher profits (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Frankel and Li, 2004; Huddart et 
al., 2007). Hence, to control for information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, I 
include analyst coverage and institutional ownership. Analyst coverage, Analysts, is 
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analyst who issued earnings 
forecasts in the prior year. Institutional ownership, InstOwn, is defined as the percentage 
of institutional ownership at the beginning of the year. In addition, following Ravina and 
Sapienza (2010) and Gao et al. (2014), I include stock return volatility, Volatility, defined 
as the variance of daily stock returns over the prior year, and share turnover, Turnover, 
defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the number of shares traded during the prior 
year divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the prior year. Finally, 
prior research connects insider trading with legal liability (Cheng and Lo, 2006; Billings 
and Cedergren, 2015; Cheng et al., 2016). I include ex-ante litigation risk, LitigationRisk, 
defined as the predicted litigation probability using Model (3) of Kim and Skinner (2012). 
Finally, I include industry and year dummies to control for systematic variation in insider 
trading both across industries and over time due to regulatory changes, and I cluster 
standard errors by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). 
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I use a tobit model because a significant fraction of the dependent variables (i.e., 
TotalTrades, Purchases, Sales) have zero values, 15  which corresponds to the corner 
solution tobit model or type I tobit model (Wooldridge, 2010). The tobit model relies on 
stricter assumptions of the functional form of the error term, and is less flexible to include 
fixed effects. Therefore, I also use OLS regression models for robustness. Additionally, 
when the likelihood of the occurrence of insider trading is used as the alternative measure 
of insider trading intensity, I employ logit regression models.  
Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (1). Panel A reports the 
results for the effects of proprietary costs on total insider trading intensity. CompScore is 
used as the proxy of proprietary costs in the first column, and four individual measures are 
used as the proprietary cost measures in the subsequent four columns. Referring to the first 
column of results, b is negative and significant (-0.401, t-statistic=-8.20), consistent with 
insiders reducing trade activities in high proprietary firms. In economic terms, for a one 
standard deviation increase in proprietary costs, there is a 0.672 share decrease in the 
predicted value of TotalTrades, which is a 23.41 % decrease relative to the mean total 
trades. 16  This form of marginal effects describes how the unobserved latent trading 
incentives change, with respect to changes in proprietary costs. Alternatively, one might 
be interested in the marginal effect of the observed trading activities, namely how the 
expected value of the observed TotalTrades changes as proprietary costs change. The 
estimated marginal effect is -0.180, which is a 10.51% decrease relative to the mean total 
                                                 
15 TotalTrades(Purchases, Sales) contains 44.20% (73.55%, 63.20%) of zero values when CompScore is 
used as the proxy of proprietary costs. 
16 The standard deviation of PropCost is 1.675, the mean of TotalTrades (Puchases, Sales) is 2.869 (0.575, 
2.016), for the sample used in Column (1) of Table 3. 
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shares traded by insiders. Turning to the results in Columns (2) to (5), the coefficient on 
PropCost is negative and significant across each of the four estimations (t-statistics ranging 
from -2.31 to -5.92), consistent with insiders trading less actively in firms with higher 
proprietary costs.  
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of insider purchase intensity across each of 
the five measures of proprietary costs. The coefficient on PropCost is negative and 
significant (coefficients ranging from -0.015 to -1.576, t-statistics ranging from -2.00 to -
3.96). The economic significance is large as well; a one standard deviation increase in 
CompScore is associated with an 11.07% decrease in observed insider buy transactions, 
relative to the mean shares purchased by insiders. Panel C of Table 3 presents the results 
of insider sales transactions. The coefficients on PropCost are negative in all of the five 
regression estimations (coefficients ranging from -0.007 to -4.199), but significant in three 
out of five specifications (t-statistics ranging from -1.01 to -7.11). A one standard deviation 
increase in CompScore is associated with a 9.97% decrease in observed insider sales 
transactions, relative to the mean shares sold by insiders.  
For the sake of brevity, the coefficients on control variables are not reported in 
Panels B and C, and are generally consistent with prior literature. Insiders trade less 
actively in large firms, sell (buy) more in growth (value) firms, and sell (buy) more when 
past returns are high (low). The number of analysts, institutional ownership, and stock 
turnover are positively associated with both insider purchases and sales, whereas litigation 
risk is negatively associated with insider sale intensity. In sum, the results are consistent 
with my hypothesis that insiders trade less actively in firms with higher proprietary costs. 
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4.2. Insider Trading Intensity Prior to Product Launch 
In this section, I examine event-driven variation in proprietary costs. Proprietary 
information risk would be especially high prior to the launch of new products because 
insider trading may reveal to rival firms the progress and the likely success of product 
development. Consistent with this, in most firms, insider trading policies explicitly state 
that insiders are not allowed to trade based on information about the timelines or the results 
of product development. Moreover, besides quarterly blackout periods prior to earnings 
announcements, firms employ event-specific blackout periods such as periods prior to the 
announcements of new product development, clinical trials or mergers and acquisitions. 
Therefore, I expect insiders will refrain from trading during product development periods, 
when proprietary costs of information transfer are especially high. 
I gather product related announcements for the period from 2002 to 2014 from the 
database compiled by S&P Capital IQ. The coverage of this database starts in 2002 and 
includes mostly unscheduled corporate information events from newswires, newspapers, 
and disclosure wires such as Reuters, Dow Jones, Comtex, Regulatory News Service, 
Bloomberg Business News, CNN, and CBS. To ensure the product announcements are 
related to new products, I restrict the press releases to include either “introduce” and “new” 
or “launch” and “new” in the headlines. To account for the possibility that Capital IQ 
covers selected firms, I restrict firms with at least one product announcement during the 
sample periods. In addition, firm-year observations that cannot be clearly classified as 
product development periods (proprietary periods) or post-product development periods 
(non-proprietary periods) are excluded from the analysis. This procedure results in 1,319 
new product announcements in 1,029 firm-years in my sample. 
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To test whether insiders reduce trading activities during proprietary periods, I 
estimate the following tobit regression model for firm i in year t: 
TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales)i,t = β PropPeriodi,t + γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt +εi,t (2) 
where the subscript i, j, and t refer to firm, Fama and French 48 industry, and year, 
respectively. The dependent variables, TotalTrades, Purchases, and Sales, are defined in 
Section 3.2.2. The main variable of interest is PropPeriod, which is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm-year is in a proprietary period, zero otherwise. Proprietary periods 
are defined as firm-year observations that have at least one product announcement in the 
subsequent year but no announcement in the current or prior year. As alternative measures 
of proprietary period, I use the two years prior and the three years prior to product 
announcements, and obtain quantitatively similar results. 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (2). TotalTrades is the 
dependent variable in the first column, and Purchases and Sales are the dependent variables 
in the subsequent columns. The coefficients on PropPeriod are negative and significant in 
each of the three regression estimations (t-statistics ranging from -1.99 to -3.79). Overall, 
the results are consistent with insiders significantly reducing trade activities prior to new 
product announcements to minimize the risk of information leakage. 
4.3. Tariff Reductions and Insider Trading Intensity: Exogenous Shocks in Proprietary 
Costs 
The evidence so far is consistent with proprietary costs discouraging insider trading 
activities. However, proprietary cost measures could be related to other unobservable firm 
characteristics which also drive insider trading decisions. To alleviate potential concerns 
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about endogeneity, I use large reductions in U.S. import tariff rates as a source of 
exogenous shocks that increase proprietary costs through increased competition. I conduct 
a difference-in-differences analysis that compares the change in insider trading intensity in 
industries that experience large tariff cuts to the change in insider trading intensity in 
industries that do not experience such a shock. 
Tariff rate reductions significantly increase competition, and hence increase 
proprietary costs for U.S. domestic firms. Valta (2012) documents that over his sample 
period, the average tariff rates drop from 3 percent to below 1.5 percent, and import 
penetration rose from 19.5 percent to 24.1 percent. Xu (2012) reports a significant decrease 
of profit margins for U.S. domestic firms following large tariff rate reductions, consistent 
with tariff rate reductions intensifying competition for U.S. domestic firms. As discussed 
in Section 3.2.1, competition from existing rivals discourages disclosure, whereas 
competition from potential entrants encourages disclosure. Huang et al. (2016) argue tariff 
rate reductions mainly increase competition from existing foreign rivals rather than from 
potential foreign entrants. This is because foreign rivals were already actively participating 
in the domestic product market even before the tariff cuts. They also observe that the 
amount of imports increases by 36 percent in the tariff reduction years, but increases only 
by 3 percent and 8 percent in the subsequent two years, indicating that the competitive 
threat from foreign entrants that begin importing in future years is relatively low. Therefore, 
insider trading in domestic firms is likely to incur higher proprietary costs after tariff 
reductions, which reduces managers’ incentives to trade.  
Tariff cuts provide a well-suited setting for examining the link between proprietary 
costs and insider trading intensity. First, tariff cuts satisfy the relevance condition. As 
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discussed above, tariff rate reductions have been shown to significantly increase 
competition (Fresard, 2010; Valta, 2012; Xu, 2012), and hence increase proprietary costs 
faced by U.S. domestic firms (Huang et al., 2016). Second, tariff rate reductions satisfy the 
exclusion condition because these reductions are likely exogenous to managers’ trading 
decisions. In recent decades, tariff rate reductions in the U.S. are mainly enacted as part of 
a trade agreement with other countries. While firms make efforts to influence trade policies 
through participating in Trade Advisory Committees, making political contributions and 
lobbying congress members, these efforts are unlikely to be related to insider trading 
incentives.17 Third, due to the staggered nature of tariff cuts, firms can be either treatment 
or control firms at different points in time, which mitigates the potential problem of 
systematic differences between treatment and control firms. Moreover, the staggered cuts 
in tariff rates alleviate the concerns that the results are confounded by other concurrent 
events. 
I follow prior literature (Fresard, 2010; Valta, 2012; Huang et al., 2016) and focus 
on large reductions in import tariff rates. To do so, I gather U.S. import data for the period 
from 1989 to 2014, and compute the tariff rate for each industry-year (at the three-digit 
SIC level). Tariff rates are calculated as the duties collected at U.S. Customs divided by 
the Free-On-Board custom value of imports. Then, I compute for each industry the largest 
and the median tariff rate changes. I identify industry-years that experience the most 
                                                 
17 The identifying assumption may be violated if the managers who want to benefit from trading their 
company stocks make efforts to prevent tariff rate reductions. However, Gaspar and Massa (2005) and Irvine 
and Pontiff (2009) document higher competition leads to more volatile idiosyncratic returns and increase 
uncertainty about the firm’s future performance, which increases insiders’ informational advantage. 
Therefore, insiders who want to profit more from their trading would make more of an effort, if any, to 
increase competition rather than to lower competition, which is likely to bias my tests against finding a 
negative relation between tariff reductions and insider trading intensity. 
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significant tariff cuts that is larger than three times the median reduction in that industry. 
To ensure that these reductions reflect non-transitory changes in the competitive landscape, 
I exclude reductions that are followed by equivalently large increases in tariff rates. This 
procedure results in 60 industries with a large tariff reduction from 1990 to 2014.18 
To investigate the effect of large shifts in import tariff rates on insider trading 
intensity, I follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Bertrand et al. (2004), Valta (2012), 
and Huang et al. (2016), and estimate the following regression model: 
TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales)i,t = β PostReductioni,t + γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt +εi,t (3) 
where the subscript i, j, and t refer to firm, SIC three-digit industry, and year, respectively. 
The dependent variables, TotalTrades, Purchases, and Sales, are defined in Section 3.2.2. 
The main variable of interest is PostReduction, which is an indicator variable equal to one 
if industry j experiences a significant tariff reduction by year t-1, and zero otherwise. As 
noted by Bertrand et al. (2004), Equation (3) is a difference-in-differences specification 
because this model controls for fixed differences between the treatment and the control 
group via industry fixed effects. β captures changes in insider trading intensity in industries 
that experience large tariff reductions relative to changes in insider trading intensity in 
industries that do not experience a similar shock. 
Table 5 presents the estimation results from Equation (3). Columns (1), (2), and (3) 
show the effects of large import tariff cuts on total insider trades, purchases, and sales, 
respectively. Across each of the three columns, the coefficient on PostReduction is 
negative and significant (coefficients ranging from -0.313 to -0.926, t-statistics ranging 
                                                 
18 This is comparable to the number of large tariff rate reductions reported in Valta (2012), in which he 
identifies 54 events between 1992 and 2005. 
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from -1.91 to -3.45), indicating that relative to control firms, firms in industries that 
experience a large tariff reduction significantly reduce insider trading activities. In 
economic terms, insiders reduce total trades by 13.77%, purchases by 10.82%, and sales 
by 13.04%, after a large tariff reduction relative to control firms. Overall, difference-in-
differences estimations support the causal nature of the deterrence effect of proprietary 
costs on insider trading intensity. 
4.4. Proprietary Costs and Insider Trading Intensity by Informativeness of Insider 
Trading 
To shed more light on the results above, I investigate how the association between 
proprietary costs and insiders’ decision to trade varies with the informativeness of insider 
trading. In particular, I ask whether insiders are more sensitive to proprietary costs when 
their trades are more likely to be informative to their rivals.  
4.4.1. Top 5 Versus Non-Top 5 Officers and Directors 
First, I examine whether top-level executives tend to reduce their trades more than 
lower-level insiders do. Top executives are the most likely to possess proprietary 
information (Peress, 2010; Cheng et al., 2016), and hence competitors would consider 
insider trading by top executives more informative. Therefore, I expect a stronger 
deterrence effect of proprietary costs on top executives’ trading than on non-top directors’ 
and officers’ trading. To test this prediction, I classify each insider trade transaction by top 
5 (CEO, CFO, COO, President, and Chairman of Board) or non-top 5 officers and directors, 
then separately estimate Equation (1). The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. While 
32 
both top- and non-top-level insiders reduce trading activities in the face of high proprietary 
costs, top executives are more sensitive to proprietary costs. The coefficients on PropCost 
are statistically different between these two types of insiders (p-values ranging from less 
than 0.01 to 0.06).  
4.4.2. Opportunistic Versus Routine Trading 
Cohen et al. (2012) document that opportunistic (non-routine) insider trading has 
higher informational value in terms of predicting future firm returns, news, and events, 
compared to routine insider trading. If managers are concerned about the revelation of 
information through their trades, they will reduce non-routine trades, which are likely to 
attract greater attention from outsiders, including rivals. 
To test this prediction, I classify each insider transaction into an opportunistic or a 
routine trade. Following Cohen et al. (2012), if an insider trades a stock in the same month 
for three consecutive years, then all subsequent trades that she makes in the same month 
are classified as routine trades. The trades completed in a different month are classified as 
opportunistic trades. If an insider trades for three consecutive years but no trades are made 
in the same month, then subsequent trades are classified as opportunistic. Panel B of Table 
6 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) in separate tests for opportunistic and 
routine trades. The results indicate that proprietary costs have a significantly negative 
association with opportunistic trades, purchases, and sales, but not with routine trades, 
purchases, and sales. More specifically, in terms of purchase transactions, insiders tend to 
significantly reduce opportunistic trading but not routine trading. In terms of sale 
transactions, insiders reduce opportunistic trades but increase routine ones, suggesting that 
33 
they shift their trades to a routine basis. To further examine this trading pattern, in 
untabulated tests, I regress the percentage of opportunistic trades to the total trades on 
PropCost, and find significantly negative associations between percentage of opportunistic 
trading and proprietary costs for both purchases and sales. These results suggest that when 
proprietary costs are high, insiders reduce trades mainly by reducing opportunistic trading. 
However, when insiders need to sell, they shift their transactions to a routine basis to avoid 
attention.  
4.4.3. Low Versus High Firm Complexity 
Firm complexity can be associated with usefulness of various information signals. 
Frankel et al. (2006) find analyst reports are less informative for firms with multiple 
segments because of high information processing costs. Similarly, insider trading in a 
complex firm (e.g., a firm with multiple segments or products) provides abstract and vague 
signals about the company’s future prospects, making it difficult and costly for competitors 
to interpret. In contrast, insider trades in a low-complexity firm convey clearer and more 
specific information about the prospects of the firm and its products, and therefore 
competitors would find it easier to process the information revealed by insider trading. 
Thus, I expect the deterrence effect of proprietary costs on insider trading to be more 
pronounced in firms with low complexity.  
To test this prediction, I classify firm-year observations into low or high firm 
complexity groups based on the industry-year median complexity, where complexity is 
defined as the total number of business and geographic segments. Panel C of Table 6 
reports the results from estimating Equation (1) in separate tests for firms with high versus 
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low complexity.19 Consistent with the idea that trades are easier to interpret by peer firms, 
insiders are more sensitive to proprietary costs in less complex firms. The difference in 
coefficients on PropCost between these two groups of firms is statistically significant for 
total trades (p-value = 0.06) and purchases (p-value = 0.02), but not significant for sale 
transactions (p-value = 0.33). 
4.5. Why Do Insiders Reduce Trades?  
4.5.1. Insider Trading Restrictions 
To further dissect the nature of the above results, I explore potential mechanisms 
through which proprietary costs limit insider trading activities. First, firms that face high 
proprietary costs could limit the information flow from insider trading by imposing insider 
trading restrictions. Corporate insider trading policies typically specify trading windows 
during which insiders are allowed to trade their stocks (Bettis et al., 2000; Roulstone, 2003; 
Jagolinzer et al., 2011). During blackout periods, companies prohibit insiders from trading. 
The most commonly-used blackout periods are prior to quarterly earnings announcements. 
I follow Roulstone (2003) and infer that a firm restricts insider trading if the firm’s insiders 
disproportionally execute their trades during the short period after earnings 
announcements.20 
                                                 
19 While this test can be done using an interaction of PropCost and complexity, for the consistency with other 
tests, I estimate the effects on proprietary costs on insider trading intensity in separate tests for firms with 
high versus low complexity, and compare the coefficients on PropCost. In addition, Ai and Norton (2003) 
note that, in nonlinear models, the coefficient and the statistical significance of the interaction term cannot 
be translated into the marginal effect of the interaction, and sometimes the coefficient can be of opposite sign 
to the actual marginal effect.  
20 Firms also employ other types of insider trading restrictions. For instance, a large percentage of firms that 
employ trading window restrictions also require insiders to get pre-approvals from their general counsels. 
Jagolinzer et al. (2011) document 80% of their 260 sample firms with insider trading policies require insider 
trades to be pre-approved by the general counsels. Hence, I use trading window restrictions as a proxy for 
insider trading policies. 
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To examine whether firms with higher proprietary costs are indeed more likely to 
impose insider trading restrictions, I estimate the following logit model: 
Pr(Insider Trading Restrictionsi,t=1) = 𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽 PropCosti,t-1+γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt + εi,t  (4) 
where the subscript i, j, and t refer to firm, Fama and French 48 industry, and year, 
respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
imposes a blackout period restriction, zero otherwise. I use a three-year rolling window to 
calculate the percentage of safe trades, which are defined as trades within a month 
following quarterly earnings announcements. A firm is considered as imposing a blackout 
period from the beginning year of the rolling window when the percentage of safe trades 
is greater than or equal to 75%. The 75% cutoff is based on the survey findings in Bettis et 
al. (2000), who show that insiders are three times more likely to trade in allowed trading 
periods than during blackout periods.21 The main variable of interest is PropCost, which is 
a composite score of proprietary costs. I include industry and year dummies, and cluster 
standard errors by firm and year. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results from estimating Equation (4), with a logit 
regression model in Column (1) and a linear likelihood model in Column (2). As shown in 
the table, firms with higher proprietary cost are significantly more likely to impose insider 
trading restrictions that are not required by law (coefficients ranging from 0.014 to 0.079, 
t-statistics ranging from 3.57 to 3.94). In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase 
in proprietary costs is associated with a 3.20% increase in the probability of imposing 
                                                 
21Similarly, Jagolinzer et al. (2011) find 24% of insider trades in their sample occur during blackout periods. 
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insider trading restrictions, which corresponds to a 5.42% increase relative to the 
unconditional mean probability (59.07%).  
In untabulated results, I also conduct a path analysis using a structural equation 
model. In this model, proprietary costs are modeled as having both direct and indirect 
(through insider trading restrictions) effects on insider trading intensity, and insider trading 
restrictions are modeled as having a direct effect on insider trading intensity. The results 
show that insider trading restrictions directly reduce total insider trades and sales, but do 
not have a significant direct effect on insider purchases. In addition, total trades and sales 
are both directly and indirectly affected by proprietary costs, whereas purchase activities 
are solely directly affected by proprietary costs. Overall, the results suggest that firms with 
high proprietary costs are more likely to employ insider trading restrictions, which in turn 
reduce insiders’ total trade and sale transactions. Moreover, the significant direct effects 
suggest that insiders reduce both purchase and sale activities voluntarily when proprietary 
cost are high.  
4.5.2. Executives’ Incentive Alignment 
Another mechanism through which insiders alter their trading behavior in the face 
of high proprietary costs is managers’ incentive alignment with shareholders. Potential loss 
of competitive advantage caused by intensive insider trading could be detrimental to 
managers if their wealth is closely linked to their firms’ performance. In this case, 
managers may voluntarily reduce trading activities even in the absence of insider trading 
restrictions. Therefore, I predict the effect of proprietary costs on insider trading intensity 
is more pronounced when executives hold greater ownership of their company. To examine 
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this prediction, I classify firm-year observations as High or Low Ownership group based 
on the industry-year median share ownership held by top five executives, and then estimate 
Equation (1) for these groups separately.  
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7. Consistent with managers’ self-
disciplining of insider trading, managers’ tendency to reduce trades in the face of 
proprietary costs are significantly stronger when they hold larger fractions of corporate 
ownership. The difference in coefficients on PropCost between high and low ownership 
groups is statistically significant (p-values < 0.01). In an untabulated test, I examine 
whether executive officers (CEOs and CFOs) and independent directors (non-officer 
directors) behave differently in facing proprietary costs. Arguably, the incentives of CEOs 
and CFOs are more tightly linked to firm performance compared to independent directors. 
Consistent with the constraining effects being stronger to insiders whose incentives are 
more aligned to those of shareholders, I find executive officers reduce both purchase and 
sale activities significantly more relative to independent directors.  
In sum, the results suggest that, when proprietary costs of information transfer are 
likely to be higher, firms are more likely to impose insider trading restrictions. In addition, 
managers also self-discipline their trading behavior especially if their interests are aligned 
with shareholders. These are potential and non-mutually exclusive reasons why insiders 
reduce trading activities when proprietary costs are high. 
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CHAPTER 5  
PROPRIETARY COSTS AND INSIDER TRADING PROFITS 
In this section, I examine whether insiders who trade despite high proprietary costs 
earn higher abnormal profits than insiders in firms with low proprietary costs. Managers 
weigh proprietary costs and financial benefits when they make trading decisions; they trade 
only when the expected benefits are greater than the expected costs. Therefore, I expect 
insiders in firms with higher proprietary costs, ceteris paribus, earn higher profits from 
their trades when they decide to trade.  
To examine whether insider trades are more profitable when proprietary costs are 
higher, I estimate the following OLS regression at the insider transaction level: 
Profiti,k,t = 𝛽𝛽 PropCosti,t-1+γ∑Controlsi,k,t+ αj + αt + εi,k,t (5) 
where the subscript i, k, and t refer to firm, transaction, and year, respectively. The 
dependent variable is insider trading profits, Profit, which is measured using daily alpha 
(Alpha), buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal returns (BHAR), and buy-and-hold size-
adjusted abnormal returns (BHRAW) over the 180 calendar days subsequent to transaction 
dates. Profits are multiplied by -1 for insider sale transactions. The main variable of interest 
is PropCost, which is a composite score of proprietary cost.  
Following Brochet (2010), Ravina and Sapienza (2010), and Gao et al. (2014), I 
include a set of control variables at the firm and transaction levels. Firm-level controls are 
firm size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), analyst following (Analysts), and institutional 
ownership (InstOwn), and are defined in Section 4.1. Insider-transaction-level controls are 
momentum (PreRet[-380,-20]), share turnover (Turnover[-380,-20]), stock return volatility 
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(Volatility[-380,-20]), and trade size (TradeSize). Momentum, share turnover, and stock return 
volatility are measured over the period between 380 and 20 days prior to the transaction 
date. PreRet[-380,-20] is included to control for insiders’ contrarian behavior, and is defined 
as the buy-and-hold stock returns. Turnover[-380,-20] controls for the intensity of investors’ 
interest in the stock, and is calculated as the natural logarithm of the sum of daily trading 
volume, where daily trading volume is the number of shares traded scaled by number of 
shares outstanding. Volatility[-380,-20] is included because insider trades are likely to be more 
informative in firms with higher uncertainty, and is computed as the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns. TradeSize controls for the link between the importance of private 
information and trade size, and is defined as the dollar value of the trade scaled by the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity. I also add industry and year fixed effects 
to control for heterogeneity of insider trading profits across industries and time, and I 
cluster standard errors by firm and year.  
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results from estimating Equation (5), with 
profitability from purchases in Columns (1) to (3) and from sales in Columns (4) and (5). 
The results indicate that insiders of firms with higher proprietary costs earn significantly 
higher profits from their buy transactions (coefficients ranging from 0.010 to 0.013, t-
statistics ranging from 2.02 to 2.30). In economic terms, when daily alpha is used as the 
measure of profitability, a one standard deviation increase in proprietary costs is associated 
with a 1.464 basis points increase of daily abnormal returns, which corresponds to a 3.69% 
increase in annual returns. The marginal effects are similar when buy-and-hold size-
adjusted abnormal returns and buy-and-hold raw returns are used as measures of insider 
trading profits; insiders earn 3.80% higher returns annually. In contrast, the coefficients on 
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PropCost are not significant for insider sales (t-statistics ranging from -0.85 to -1.22), 
indicating that insiders do not earn significantly higher profits from their sales transactions 
when proprietary costs are higher.22 In addition, I rerun these tests using a 360-calendar-
day profitability window and obtain quantitatively similar results (untabulated). Overall, 
these findings suggest that even though managers engage in less intensive insider trading 
in the face of higher proprietary costs, when they do engage in purchases, their trades are 
based on more valuable information.  
Cohen et al. (2012) suggest that the profitability of insider trades is derived mainly 
from opportunistic trading. Accordingly, I examine whether greater insider trading profits 
in firms with higher proprietary costs are driven by opportunistic trading. I estimate 
Equation (5) separately for opportunistic trades and routine trades, and the results for Alpha 
are presented in Panel B of Table 8.23 Consistent with insiders primarily profiting from 
non-routine trading, insiders in firms with higher proprietary costs earn significantly higher 
profits from opportunistic purchases (t-statistic = 3.23), but not from routine purchases (t-
statistic = -1.64). A one standard deviation increase in proprietary costs is associated with 
an 8.85% increase in annual abnormal returns, suggesting that insiders in firms with higher 
proprietary costs make substantially higher profits from their non-routine purchases. In 
addition, I continue to find insignificant insider trading profits for both opportunistic and 
routine sales. This result might be due to noise in the classification of opportunistic and 
routine sales.    
                                                 
22 Prior works that examine insider trading profits generally report insignificant returns for sales because 
insider sales are likely driven by personal liquidity, diversification, and other motivations that are not 
necessarily related to private information (e.g., Jeng et al., 2003; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Seyhun, 1986). 
23 I also investigate buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal returns and buy-and-hold raw returns and find 
quantitatively similar results. 
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CHAPTER 6  
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
6.1. Litigation Risk as an Alternative Explanation 
An alternative explanation for the negative association between proprietary costs 
and insider trading intensity is that the proprietary cost measures also proxy for litigation 
risk, and it is the litigation risk that affects insider trading decisions. However, this 
plausible alternative explanation does not alter my main conclusion for the following 
reasons. First, I include litigation risk, the predicted litigation probability from Kim and 
Skinner (2012), as a control variable throughout the tests. Second, the correlation between 
the composite measure of proprietary costs and litigation risk is very low (0.9%), indicating 
that these two measures capture different constructs. Third, the findings that insiders reduce 
purchase transactions are unlikely to be explained by litigation risk because extant 
literature documents insiders are exposed to legal risk almost exclusively when they sell 
before bad news, but not when they buy before good news. For example, Johnson et al. 
(2007) find litigation increases after abnormal insider sales, especially after the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and Billings and Cedergren (2015) find the 
probability of being sued significantly increases when insiders engage in sales prior to the 
announcement of negative earnings news and fail to provide prior warnings. In addition, 
Cohen et al. (2012) find the number of opportunistic sale transactions significantly 
increases the probability of being investigated by the SEC, but the number of opportunistic 
buys does not, suggesting that insiders face very limited legal risk when they exploit 
positive private information. Fourth, the findings that the negative relation between 
proprietary costs and insider trading intensity is more pronounced in less complex firms 
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and when managers’ interests are more aligned with those of shareholders are consistent 
with the deterrence effect of proprietary costs on insider trading. However, these findings 
are less consistent with litigation risk explanations because there are no clear reasons to 
believe that firm complexity and incentive alignment are associated with legal risk. 
To further examine whether the results hold in firms with different degrees of 
litigation risk, I investigate the effects of proprietary costs on insider trading intensity 
across litigation risk quintiles. Firm-year observations are classified into lowest to highest 
litigation risk quintiles based on industry-year cutoff points. The results for total trades, 
purchases, and sales are presented in Panel A, B, and C of Table 9, respectively. As shown 
in the table, across each quintile of litigation risk, the effect of proprietary costs on total 
trades, purchases, and sales is negative and significant (t-statistics ranging from -1.73 to -
5.89). Overall, these results further suggest that the relation is not driven by litigation risk. 
6.2. Additional Robustness Tests 
I conduct a battery of additional robustness tests (untabulated). First, I consider four 
alternative measures of insider trading intensity: i) the dollar value of insider trading scaled 
by the firm’s market capitalization at the beginning of the year, ii) the number of 
transactions scaled by the number of active insiders, where active insiders are defined as 
insiders who have reported at least one insider stock transaction during my sample period,  
iii) the likelihood of the occurrence of insider trading, and iv) the number shares traded 
scaled by their share ownership. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to 
those tabulated in Table 3 and the inferences remain unchanged. For example, when the 
dollar value of insider trades (purchases, sales) is used as the measure of insider trading 
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intensity, the coefficient on PropCost is -0.491 (-0.150, -0.524) with a t-statistic of -7.88 
(-3.49, -7.07).  
Second, the results are robust to alternative model specifications. Since the tobit 
model requires stricter assumptions on the functional form of error terms, I check the 
robustness of the results using OLS regression models. In addition, when the likelihood of 
the occurrence of insider trading is used as the insider trading intensity measure, I employ 
logit regression models. The results are similar to those tabulated in Table 3. For example, 
the coefficient on PropCost is -0.246 (-0.017, -0.204) with a t-statistic of -8.86 (-1.52, -
8.65) when using an OLS model and -0.040 (-0.062, -0.032) with a t-statistic of -3.90 (-
4.71, -2.54) when using a logit model.  
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
Previous studies have extensively investigated the potential determinants and 
consequences of insider trading, with most of them focusing on capital market implications 
of insider trading. On the other hand, studies on voluntary disclosure have long examined 
the trade-off between capital market benefits and product market costs of disclosure. In 
this paper, I argue insider trading can reveal proprietary information, allowing rivals to 
compete more effectively against the insiders’ firm.  
I use a variety of approaches to identify proprietary costs. First, I employ four 
proxies of proprietary costs suggested by King et al. (1990), and find a negative association 
between proprietary costs and insiders’ trading activities. Second, I examine insider trading 
intensity prior to new product launches, when the proprietary information risk is 
particularly high, and find insiders significantly reduce trading intensity during this period. 
In addition, using large reductions in U.S. import tariff rates as a source of exogenous 
variation in proprietary costs, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. The results 
show that insiders in industries that have experienced a large tariff reduction significantly 
reduce trading activities, compared to insiders in unaffected industries. Consistent with 
proprietary concerns driving the results, the deterrence effect is stronger when insider 
trading is potentially more informative to rivals. Further analysis shows that firms with 
higher proprietary costs are more likely to employ insider trading policies, and that insiders 
are more sensitive to proprietary costs when their wealth is more closely linked to that of 
shareholders. These results suggest that insiders reduce trading activities not only due to 
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firm policies but also due to incentive alignment. Finally, when insiders trade despite 
higher proprietary costs, they earn significantly higher abnormal profits. 
Overall, this study suggests that product market considerations are an important 
factor associated with insiders’ trading decisions and profitability of their trades. These 
findings are likely to be of interest to regulators and corporate boards in setting insider 
trading policies, and help investors make investment decisions using insider trading signals. 
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APPENDIX A  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
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Proprietary Cost Measures 
CompScore Sum of the values of four individual proxies below, where each 
proxy is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance 
R&D_Intensity R&D expenditures scaled by total expenses, where total expenses 
are calculated by subtracting income before extraordinary items 
from revenues 
NumPatents The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents filed 
SG&A_Intensity SG&A expense scaled by total expenses, where total expenses are 
calculated by subtracting income before extraordinary items from 
revenues 
ProdSimilarity Product similarity score from Hoberg and Phillips data library 
PostReduction An indicator variable equal to one if the industry experiences a 
tariff rate reduction by year t-1 that is larger than three times the 
median tariff rate reduction in that industry, zero otherwise 
PropPeriod An indicator variable indicating the year prior to a new product 
launch 
Insider Trading Intensity Measures 
TotalTrades The total number of shares traded by insiders during the year, 
scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning 
of the year, multiplied by 1,000  
Purchases The total number of shares purchased by insiders during the year, 
scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning 
of the year, multiplied by 1,000  
Sales The total number of shares sold by insiders during the year, scaled 
by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
year, multiplied by 1,000  
Firm Characteristics 
Size The natural logarithm of the market value of the equity at the 
beginning of the year 
BM Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year 
PreRet Buy-and-hold stock returns over the prior year 
Coverage The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts who 
issued earnings forecasts in the prior year 
InstOwn Percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of the year 
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Turnover The natural logarithm of the ratio of the number of shares traded 
during the prior year divided by number of shares outstanding at 
the beginning of the prior year 
Litigation Predicted litigation probability using Model (3) of Kim and 
Skinner (2012) 
Volatility Variance of daily stock returns over the prior year 
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APPENDIX B  
TABLES 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Number of  
firm-years 
Number of 
distinct firms 
All firm-year observations from Compustat with fiscal year 
ends December 31, 1986 - December 31, 2014 264,412  27,523  
Less missing required data to construct control variables (136,638) (13,493) 
Samples for the tests when:   
PropCost = R&D_Intensity 127,774  14,030  
PropCost = NumPatents 116,032  13,560  
PropCost = SG&A_Intensity 104,768  12,196  
PropCost = ProdSiimilarity 73,981  9,685  
PropCost = CompScore 52,896  8,047  
      
Sample Selection Criteria 
Number of  
transactions 
Number of 
distinct firms 
All insider trading transactions completed by top 5 executives 
(i.e., CEO, CFO, COO, President, and Chairman of Board) 
during sample period January 1, 1986 - December 31, 2014 
3,225,958  24,320  
Less transactions completed outside of the open market (1,652,030) (4,507) 
Less transactions without sufficient level of accuracy and 
reasonableness (i.e., TFN Cleanse Indicator is not ‘S’ or ‘A’) (205,601) (877) 
Less transactions without required data to construct control 
variables and PropCost (557,710) (11,282) 
Less transactions with missing stock return data to compute 
Alpha (10,268) (30) 
Final sample 800,349  7,624  
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Table2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std.Dev. 
 
Proprietary Cost Measures  
CompScore 0.251 -0.930 -0.662 1.024 1.672  
R&D_Intensity 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.123  
NumPatents 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.075  
SG&A_Intensity 0.297 0.149 0.255 0.391 0.203  
ProdSimilarity 9.039 1.323 2.397 6.356 17.471  
Insider Trading Intensity Measures 
 
TotalTrades 2.266 0.000 0.000 1.001 7.229  
Purchases 0.474 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.322  
Sales 1.560 0.000 0.000 0.224 5.341  
Firm Characteristics  
Size 5.438 3.761 5.345 7.018 2.283  
BM 0.693 0.314 0.556 0.884 0.659  
PreRet 0.155 -0.213 0.062 0.354 0.670  
Analysts 1.159 0.000 1.099 2.197 1.187  
InstOwn 0.345 0.042 0.281 0.603 0.308  
Turnover -0.235 -0.977 -0.185 0.576 1.136  
Volatility 0.036 0.020 0.029 0.045 0.022  
Litigation 0.291 0.068 0.175 0.433 0.288  
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Table 3  
Proprietary Costs and Insider Trading Intensity 
TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales)i,t = β PropCosti,t-1 + γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt +εi,t  
Panel B: Insider Purchases 
  Dependent Variable: Purchases 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
PropCost:  CompScore  R&D_Intensity  NumPatents  SG&A_Intensity  ProdSimilarity 
PropCost -0.174 ***  -1.576 ***  -0.110 **  -0.766 ***  -0.015 *** 
  (-3.96)    (-3.64)    (-2.00)    (-2.94)    (-3.15)   
                          
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 52,896   127,774      116,032      104,768     73,981    
Pseudo R2(%) 3.07    3.17    3.00    3.16    3.23   
 
Panel A: Total Insider Trades 
  Dependent Variable: TotalTrades 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
PropCost: CompScore  R&D_Intensity  NumPatents  SG&A_Intensity  ProdSimilarity 
PropCost -0.401 ***  -4.589 ***  -0.285 ***  -1.073 **  -0.021 *** 
  (-8.20)    (-5.92)    (-4.01)    (-2.31)    (-3.15)   
Size -0.487 ***  -1.332 ***  -1.366 ***  -1.302 ***  -0.513 *** 
  (-6.05)    (-11.33)    (-12.13)    (-10.38)    (-6.79)   
BM -1.666 ***  -2.101 ***  -2.028 ***  -2.275 ***  -1.523 *** 
  (-5.48)    (-8.84)    (-8.22)    (-8.32)    (-6.38)   
PreRet 1.846 ***  1.546 ***  1.550 ***  1.678 ***  1.697 *** 
  (6.34)    (6.66)    (6.14)    (6.51)    (6.64)   
Analysts 0.571 ***  1.012 ***  1.111 ***  0.955 ***  0.464 *** 
  (5.83)    (8.96)    (9.87)    (7.76)    (5.41)   
InstOwn 2.591 ***  7.808 ***  8.092 ***  8.339 ***  2.222 *** 
  (5.03)    (13.67)    (13.43)    (13.74)    (5.46)   
Turnover 1.007 ***  0.958 ***  0.966 ***  0.866 ***  0.992 *** 
  (6.12)    (7.30)    (7.12)    (5.91)    (6.57)   
Volatility -7.349    -6.449    -7.663    -0.211    -14.450 * 
  (-0.88)    (-1.22)    (-1.39)    (-0.04)    (-1.93)   
LitigationRisk -0.125    -0.939 ***  -0.866 ***  -0.824 ***  -0.556 ** 
  (-0.40)    (-3.27)    (-2.74)    (-2.76)    (-2.04)   
                          
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 52,896   127,774      116,032      104,768      73,981     
Pseudo R2(%) 0.94    2.22    2.18    2.17    0.91   
59 
Panel C: Insider Sales 
  Dependent Variable: Sales 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
PropCost: CompScore  R&D_Intensity  NumPatents  SG&A_Intensity  ProdSimilarity 
PropCost -0.398 ***  -4.199 ***  -0.407 ***  -0.765    -0.007   
  (-7.11)    (-4.69)    (-5.26)    (-1.38)    (-1.01)   
                          
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 52,896   127,774      116,032     104,768     73,981    
Pseudo R2(%) 3.77    4.97    4.90    4.90    3.75   
Notes: This table presents the results from tobit regressions of insider trading intensity on proprietary costs. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample covers the period 1986 to 
2014. The dependent variables are the number of shares traded (TotalTrades), purchased (Purchases), and 
sold (Sales) by insiders during the year scaled by total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
year, in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Insiders are defined as top 5 officers and directors: chief executive 
officers, chief finance officers, chairman of the board, chief operating officers, and presidents. Proprietary 
costs are measured using four individual proxies, R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, and 
ProdSimilarity, and a composite score, CompScore. CompScore is the sum of the values of the four individual 
proxies, where each proxy is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. See Appendix A for additional 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
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Table 4  
Insider Trading Intensity before Product Launch 
TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales)i,t = β PropPeriodi,t + γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt +εi,t 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable:  TotalTrades  Purchases  Sales 
PropPeriod -0.744 ***  -0.275 **  -0.559 *** 
 (-3.79)    (-1.99)    (-2.69)   
Size -0.584 ***  -0.354 ***  -0.278   
  (-2.90)    (-4.83)    (-1.21)   
BM -2.061 ***  -0.061    -2.696 *** 
  (-4.99)    (-0.39)    (-4.68)   
PreRet 2.252 ***  -0.278    3.035 *** 
  (3.51)    (-1.54)    (3.93)   
Analysts -0.040    -0.138    0.092   
  (-0.15)    (-1.14)    (0.33)   
InstOwn 1.169    -0.652 **  2.905 *** 
  (1.21)    (-2.04)    (2.67)   
Turnover 1.158 ***  0.145    1.395 *** 
  (2.65)    (0.79)    (3.33)   
Volatility -65.029 ***  2.524    -83.268 *** 
  (-2.71)    (0.33)    (-2.77)   
Litigation -0.905    -0.193    -1.370 * 
  (-1.22)    (-0.67)    (-1.86)   
         
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 4,315      4,315     4,315    
Pseudo R2(%) 2.02    6.17    3.45   
Notes: This table presents the results from tobit regressions of insider trading intensity on proprietary periods. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample covers the period 2002 to 
2014. The dependent variables are the number of shares traded (TotalTrades), purchased (Purchases), and 
sold (Sales) by insiders during the year scaled by total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
year, in Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Insiders are defined as top 5 officers and directors: chief 
executive officers, chief finance officers, chairman of the board, chief operating officers, and presidents. 
PropPeriod is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year is in a proprietary period, zero otherwise. 
Proprietary periods are firm-year observations that have at least one product announcement in the 
subsequent year but no announcement in the current or prior year. See Appendix A for additional variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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Table 5 
Reductions of Import Tariff Rates and Insider Trading Intensity 
 
TotalTrades (Purchases, Sales)i,t = β PostReductioni,t + γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt +εi,t 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable:  TotalTrades  Purchases  Sales 
PostReduction -0.908 ***  -0.313 *  -0.926 *** 
 (-3.45)    (-1.91)    (-3.30)   
Size -1.319 ***  -0.912 ***  -0.611 *** 
  (-11.23)    (-14.56)    (-5.70)   
BM -2.046 ***  0.081    -3.915 *** 
  (-8.49)    (1.13)    (-9.77)   
PreRet 1.480 ***  -0.746 ***  2.831 *** 
  (6.32)    (-5.95)    (8.60)   
Analysts 1.028 ***  0.192 ***  1.000 *** 
  (9.37)    (4.13)    (7.28)   
InstOwn 8.055 ***  0.861 ***  9.479 *** 
  (13.08)    (4.98)    (12.98)   
Turnover 0.849 ***  0.149 ***  1.218 *** 
  (6.34)    (2.65)    (8.64)   
Volatility -7.919    -1.625    -27.836 *** 
  (-1.42)    (-0.52)    (-3.20)   
Litigation -0.929 ***  0.109    -1.535 *** 
  (-3.12)    (0.74)    (-4.57)   
         
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 116,610     116,610    116,610  
Pseudo R2(%) 2.14    3.47    4.88  
Notes: This table presents results of difference-in-differences tobit regressions examining the effect of tariff 
rate reductions on insider trading intensity. Standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
sample covers calendar years 1990 to 2014. The dependent variables are the number of shares traded 
(TotalTrades), purchased (Purchases), and sold (Sales) by insiders during the year scaled by total number 
of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year, in Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. PostReduction 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the industry experiences a tariff rate reduction by year t-1 that is larger 
than three times the median tariff rate reduction in that industry, zero otherwise. See Appendix A for 
additional variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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Table 6  
Proprietary Costs and Insider Trading Intensity by Informativeness of Insider 
Trading  
Panel A: Top 5 Versus Non-Top 5 Officers and Directors 
Dependent Variable: TotalTrades  Purchases  Sales 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Top 5 Non-Top 5   Top 5 Non-Top 5   Top 5 Non-Top 5  
PropCost -0.401 *** -0.252 ***  -0.174 *** -0.037    -0.398 *** -0.286 *** 
  
(-8.20)   (-3.77)    (-3.96)   (-1.00)    (-7.11)   (-5.84)   
p-value for the test of equal coefficients on PropCost: Top5 vs. non-top5 officers and directors 
TotalTrades:     0.02 
Purchases:  < 0.01 
Sales:     0.06 
          
 
  
  
      
 
        
Control variables Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 52,896    52,896    52,896  52,896     52,896    52,896    
Pseudo R2(%) 0.94   0.54    3.07   1.52    3.77   2.22   
 
Panel B: Opportunistic Versus Routine Trading 
Dependent Variable: TotalTrades  Purchases  Sales 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Opportunistic Routine   Opportunistic Routine   Opportunistic Routine  
PropCost -0.182 *** 0.079 ***  -0.159 *** -0.006    -0.154 *** 0.070 *** 
  
(-3.77)   (2.77)    (-4.41)   (-1.12)    (-2.70)   (2.84)  
p-value for the test of equal coefficients on PropCost: Opportunistic vs. routine trades  
TotalTrades:  < 0.01 
Purchases:  < 0.01 
Sales:  < 0.01 
          
 
  
  
      
 
        
Control variables Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 52,896    52,896    52,896  52,896    52,896    52,896    
Pseudo R2(%) 2.29   3.68    3.38   3.46    6.15   8.19   
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Panel C: Low Versus High Complexity 
Dependent Variable: TotalTrades  Purchases  Sales 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Low 
Complexity 
High 
Complexity 
 Low 
Complexity 
High 
Complexity 
 Low 
Complexity 
High 
Complexity 
PropCost -0.472 *** -0.287 ***  -0.247 *** -0.096 *  -0.411 *** -0.302 *** 
  
(-6.49)   (-3.98)    (-4.72)   (-1.87)    (-4.47)   (-3.74)   
p-value for the test of equal coefficient on PropCost: Low vs. high complexity 
TotalTrades:    0.06 
Purchases:    0.02 
Sales:    0.33 
          
 
  
  
      
 
        
Control variables Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 33,821    19,075     33,821  19,075    33,821    19,075    
Pseudo R2(%) 1.05   0.95    2.64   4.16    4.27   3.01   
Notes: This table presents the results from cross-sectional tobit regressions of insider trading intensity on 
proprietary costs. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample covers the 
period 1986 to 2014. The dependent variables are the number of shares traded (TotalTrades), purchased 
(Purchases), or sold (Sales) by insiders during the year, scaled by total number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the year. In Panel A, each insider transaction is classified as top 5 or non-top 5 officers and 
directors. In Panel B, each insider transaction is classified as opportunistic or routine trade. If an insider trades 
a stock in the same month in three consecutive years, then all subsequent trades that she makes in the same 
month are classified as routine trades and the trades completed in a different month are classified as 
opportunistic trades. If an insider trades in three consecutive years but no trades are made in the same month, 
then subsequent trades are classified as opportunistic trades. In Panel C, firm-year observations are classified 
as low or high firm complexity based on the industry-year median complexity, where complexity is defined 
as the total number of business and geographic segments. The results for the test of equal coefficients are 
presented toward the bottom of each panel. PropCost is a composite score of proprietary cost, defined as the 
sum of the values of four individual proprietary costs proxies, R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, 
and ProdSimilarity, where each proxy is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. See Appendix A 
for additional variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
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Table 7 
Mechanisms: Insider Trading Restrictions and Executives’ Incentive Alignment 
Panel A: Likelihood of Imposing Insider Trading Restrictions 
Pr(Insider Trading Restrictionsi,t=1) = 𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽PropCosti,t-1+γ∑Controlsi,t-1+ αj + αt + εi,t) 
Notes: This table presents results from the analyses of potential channels through which proprietary costs 
reduce insider trading activities. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
sample covers the period 1986 to 2014. Panel A reports the results from the regressions of likelihood of 
imposing insider trading restrictions on proprietary costs. The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm employs blackout periods, zero otherwise. Safe trades are defined as insider trades 
within a month following quarterly earnings announcements, and calculated using a three-year rolling 
window. A firm is considered as imposing a blackout period from the beginning year of the rolling window 
when the percentage of safe trades is greater than or equal to 75%. The result from a logit regression is 
reported in Column (1) and from a linear likelihood model is reported in Column (2). Panel B presents the 
results from cross-sectional tobit regressions of insider trading intensity on proprietary costs. Firm-year 
observations are classified into high or low ownership based on the industry-year median share ownership 
held by executives. The results for the test of equal coefficients are presented toward the bottom of Panel B. 
PropCost is a composite score of proprietary cost, defined as the sum of the values of four individual 
proprietary costs proxies, R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, and ProdSimilarity, where each 
proxy is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. See Appendix A for additional variable definitions. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.   
Dependent Variable: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (Insider Trading Restrictions = 1) 
 (1) (2)   
  Logit Linear Likelihood  
PropCost 0.079 *** 0.014 ***   
  (3.94)   (3.57)     
            
Control variables Yes  Yes   
Ind. and year dummies Yes  Yes   
Observations 42,445     42,445      
Pseudo/Adjusted  R2 (%) 12.62   15.79     
Panel B: Incentive Alignment ─ High Versus Low Ownership 
Dependent Variable: TotalTrades  Purchases  Sales 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
High 
Ownership 
Low 
Ownership 
 High 
Ownership 
Low 
Ownership 
 High 
Ownership 
Low 
Ownership 
PropCost -0.570 *** -0.095 *  -0.111 *** -0.026    -0.589 *** -0.119 ** 
  (-4.74)   (-1.86)    (-9.87)   (-0.79)    (-4.06)   (-2.12)   
p-value for the test of equal coefficients on PropCost: High vs. low ownership 
TotalTrades:  < 0.01 
Purchases:  < 0.01 
Sales:  < 0.01 
          
 
  
  
      
 
        
Control variables Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Observations 3,588    3,855    3,588  3,855     3,588    3,855    
Pseudo R2(%) 2.01   2.64    5.67   9.52    3.55   4.81   
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Table 8 
Proprietary Costs and Insider Trading Profits  
Profiti,k,t = 𝛽𝛽 PropCosti,t-1+γ∑Controlsi,k,t+ αj + αt + εi,k,t 
Panel B: Insider Trading Profits ─ Opportunistic Versus Routine Trades 
 Dependent Variable: Profit_Alpha 
 Purchases  Sales 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Opportunistic   Routine   Opportunistic   Routine  
PropCost 0.024 ***  -0.010     -0.003   -0.004   
  (3.23)    (-1.64)     (-1.15)   (-0.41)   
                  
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 25,724   6,848      183,645   61,495   
Adjusted R2(%) 19.03   38.60     8.00   19.39   
Notes: This table presents the results from OLS regressions of insider trading profits on proprietary costs 
conducted at the insider-transaction level. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The sample covers calendar years 1986 to 2014. Panel A reports insider trading profits for all 
Panel A: Insider Trading Profits ─ All Trades 
 Dependent Variable: Profit 
 Purchases  Sales 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Alpha BHAR BHRAW   Alpha BHAR BHRAW 
PropCost 0.010 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 **   -0.004   -0.007   -0.005   
  (2.30)   (2.28)   (2.02)     (-0.85)   (-1.22)   (-0.91)   
Size -0.021 ** -0.013   -0.019 *   -0.002   0.004   0.004   
  (-2.08)   (-1.50)   (-1.80)     (-0.42)   (0.57)   (0.32)   
BM 0.025 ** 0.045 ** 0.046 *   -0.014   -0.012   -0.018   
  (2.23)   (2.13)   (1.91)     (-0.80)   (-0.74)   (-0.95)   
Analysts 0.031 *** 0.027 ** 0.037 ***   -0.008   -0.013   -0.014   
  (3.57)   (2.46)   (3.20)     (-1.10)   (-1.35)   (-1.32)   
InstOwn 0.126 *** 0.217 *** 0.226 ***   -0.062 ** -0.071 ** -0.061 * 
  (3.83)   (3.64)   (3.78)     (-2.27)   (-2.40)   (-1.89)   
PreRet[-380,-20] -0.033 *** -0.013   -0.004     0.005   0.012   0.018   
  (-3.80)   (-0.83)   (-0.25)     (0.47)   (1.22)   (1.43)   
Turnover[-380,-20] -0.027 *** -0.007   -0.016     0.006   0.002   0.001   
  (-3.62)   (-0.61)   (-1.35)     (0.59)   (0.19)   (0.07)   
Volatility[-380,-20] 4.053 *** 1.819   2.725 *   0.016   2.390 ** 2.274   
  (5.18)   (1.60)   (1.90)     (0.02)   (2.11)   (1.64)   
Trade Size 0.005   0.002   -0.064     -0.015   0.015   0.044   
 (0.13)   (0.03)   (-1.16)     (-0.51)   (0.46)   (1.16)   
                        
Ind. and year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 107,273  107,882     107,882     693,076  693,601    693,601   
Adjusted R2(%) 11.88  5.49   13.30     4.40  6.95   15.43   
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insider trades. Insider trading profits are measured by daily alpha (Alpha), the intercept from the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model estimated over the 180 calendar days following the transaction date, in Columns (1) 
and (4), six-month size decile portfolio adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in Columns (2) and 
(5), and raw buy-and-hold returns (BHRAW) in Columns (3) and (6). Panel B reports insider trading profits 
(Alpha) from opportunistic or routine trades. If an insider trades a stock in the same month in three 
consecutive years, then all subsequent trades that she makes in the same month are classified as routine trades 
and the trades completed in a different month are classified as opportunistic trades. If an insider trades in 
three consecutive years but no trades are made in the same month, then subsequent trades are classified as 
opportunistic trades. Profits are multiplied by -1 for insider sale transactions. Insiders are defined as top 5 
officers and directors: chief executive officers, chief finance officers, chairman of the board, chief operating 
officers, and presidents. PropCost is a composite score of proprietary cost, defined as the sum of the values 
of four individual proprietary costs proxies, R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, and 
ProdSimilarity, where each proxy is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. See Appendix A for 
additional variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
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Table 9  
Proprietary Costs and Insider Trading Intensity by Litigation Risk  
Panel A: Total Insider Trades 
  Dependent Variable: TotalTrades 
 
Litigation Risk 
(1)  
Lowest 
 (2)  
 
 (3)  
 
 (4)  
 
 (5)  
Highest 
PropCost -0.876 ***  -0.399 ***  -0.363 ***  -0.300 ***  -0.359 *** 
  (-5.89)    (-4.31)    (-3.66)    (-3.69)    (-3.77)   
                          
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 10,874   10,584      10,569      10,587     10,282    
Pseudo R2(%) 1.35    1.00    0.83    1.08    1.13   
Panel B: Insider Purchases 
  Dependent Variable: Purchases 
 
Litigation Risk 
(1)  
Lowest 
 (2)  
 
 (3)  
 
 (4)  
 
 (5)  
Highest 
PropCost -0.273 ***  -0.257 ***  -0.128 *  -0.091 *  -0.161 ** 
  (-3.32)    (-2.88)    (-1.83)    (-1.73)    (-2.53)   
                          
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 10,874   10,584      10,569      10,587     10,282    
Pseudo R2(%) 2.77    3.62    3.99    4.12    2.90   
Panel C: Insider Sales 
  Dependent Variable: Sales 
 
Litigation Risk 
(1)  
Lowest  
(2) 
  
 (3)  
 
 (4)  
  
(5)  
Highest 
PropCost -0.825 ***  -0.295 ***  -0.365 ***  -0.354 ***  -0.416 *** 
  (-3.91)    (-2.71)    (-4.45)    (-3.91)    (-4.22)   
                          
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Ind. and year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 10,874   10,584      10,569      10,587     10,282    
Pseudo R2(%) 4.66    4.02    3.30    3.66    4.03   
Notes: This table presents the results from tobit regressions of insider trading intensity on proprietary costs 
by litigation risk quintiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample covers 
calendar years 1986 to 2014. Firm-year observations are classified into low to high litigation risk quintiles 
based on industry-year cutoff points. Litigation risk is predicted using the litigation probability estimated 
using the Model (3) of Kim and Skinner (2012). The dependent variables are the number of shares traded 
(TotalTrades), purchased (Purchases), and sold (Sales) by insiders during the year scaled by total number of 
shares outstanding at the beginning of the year, in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. PropCost is a composite 
score of proprietary cost, defined as the sum of the values of four individual proprietary costs proxies, 
R&D_Intensity, NumPatents, SG&A_Intensity, and ProdSimilarity, where each proxy is standardized to have 
zero mean and unit variance. See Appendix A for additional variable definitions. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
